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THE PRESUMPTION OF DEATH.
When A's right depends on the the death of X, A who alleges
the right has the burden of satisfying the tribunal of the death of
X. Evidence of X's death may be direct. One who has known
him, may have seen him die, or may have seen and identified as
his, his body after death. But possibly in comparatively few
cases is the direct evidence available. The death in question
may be alleged to have occurred ten, twenty, forty, eighty years
ago, and at a locality remote from that at which the investigation
is being conducted.
Comparatively few persons ever see a man
whom they have known die, or witness his body after death.
Much of the evidence of death is circumstantial; the reputation
among one's relatives, their conduct expressive of their belief
that he is dead, the fact that, being reported dead by relatives
and intimate friends who would probably know whether he was
dead or not, persons who had previously seen him on the street,
at church, or the counting house, at his office, see him no more.
These circumstances are usually related 'to the death as effects to
a cause. The fact of death is the inferred cause of the opinion
of relatives, of the disappearance of the person from his customary places. It is argued, X would be seen on the street, at
church, etc., as heretofore, if he were still alive. X's friends
would not report that, or otherwise act as if they believed that,
he was dead, unless he was in fact dead. The newspapers of the
neighborhood would not have contained the obituary notice of
X's death, had he not been dead.
X's merely ceasing to be visible in the community in which
he has lived, would not lead to the inference of his death. Had
(51)
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he died, his body would probably have been discovered. His
departure alive, from the place is a more probable explanation.
The fact that X suddenly disappeared from his home, and for a
year, two, three, four years afterwards, has not been seen or heard
from or of, as it would be more probably explained by his yoluntary though unannounced, withdrawal from the place will not
warrant the assumption that his death was the cause of his disappearance. There may however, be other evidence that he departed alive from the place of his former habitation. He may
have been seen to start in the cars or on a steamer. He may
have announced his plan and intention to go, closing up his business, and bidding his friends farewell. Being alive when he left,
what inference is to be drawn concerning his continuance in life?
Other places are as consistent with continuance alive, as that
which he left, and the mere act of motion, of travel by railroad,
or stage, or ship, or afoot does not -warrant a conclusion that it
in a short time has killed the traveller. The ratio of fatal travelling to safe, is not so great as to justify any such suspicion.1
When X is known to have been alive on a certain day he is
presumed to be alive at any future time which is not so far distant from that day, as to require the belief of his death. If X
was 10 years old 20 years ago, there is no probability that he is
now dead; but if he was then 70 years old, his dying since is not improbable. If X was 10 years old 70 years ago, there is no probability that he is alive now. A deed was made purlIorting to be,
but not adequately proved to be, by Andrew Wallace and Eleanor
his wife, on Aug. 15th, 1805. In a trial held in 1829, the question
was whether Eleanor was still alive, and her dower still an encumbrance on the land. Her age in 1805 was not shown. Gibson
C. J. held that the lapse of 24 years was sufficient to warrant a
presumption of her death, saying "under the most favorable circumstances, the chances are unfavorable to the presumption of
her having been alive at the time of the trial. If living she must
have attained an age considerably in advance of the average term
of human existence." 2 The deed purported to have been exe'Burr
v. Sims, 4 Wh. 15o; Mutual Benefit Co.'s Petition, 174 Pa. x.
2
Innis v. Campbell, i R. 41 9. The jury had not considered the question
of Mrs. Wallace's death. The Supreme Court itself applies the presumption and so avoids reversing the judgment of the Court below. In Williams'
Estat6, 8 W. N. C. 319, it is assurqed that A's husband being in England in
1844, would in i88o, be presumed to have continued alive in 1864, when A

married another, but for the conflicting presumption'of her innocence.
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cuted in Ohio, and there was no evidence that Mrs. Wallace had
ever gone from her then home, or whether she had been heard
of during seven years. Gibson C. J. not knowing the age of
Mrs. Wallace in 1805, is sure, nevertheless, that if alive in 1829,
she would be considerably older than the average term, and he
tacitly asserts the principle that in any particular case, a person
may be assumed to die at or before the average time of death,.a
not very probable supposition. A large proportion of persons must
exceed the average, in order to make it an average. General
phrases like this: "A person, proved to have been alive at a particular time, is presumed to be so still," and "the onus of proof is
on him who alleges the contrary"' or like this: "when a man has
been proved to be living, the first general presumption is that he
continues to live, unless.the contrary be proved; the proof of death
is shown, therefore, on the party who asserts it"' must be received
with the qualification indicated. The greatness of the time that has
elapsed may itself justify or even require the inference of death.'
When X leaves his home then, whether publicly or not, he
is presumed to continue alive one, two, three, six, seven, or a
greater number of years, unless, at his leaving, he was so old or
sick that his earlier death was probable. The ordinary man
however, having left his former domicile, continues in some way
and at intervals shorter or longer to keep up communications
with it. Mail connections, cheap postage, the prevalence of the
knowledge of the art of writing, make these communications
generally, easy. It is always possible however, that X may go
to one of the few places with which there is no communication.
He may also have left no one beliind him, no father or mother,
no brother or sister, no wife, no intimate friend, with whom be
would care to correspond. He might have fled from a threatened
prosecution for crime, and had a palpable motive to conceal from
all at home the place where he had gone, .his business, and
whether he was alive. In one case, X left home in consequence
'Gibson C. J., Innis v. Campbell, i R. 419.

In Taylor v. Hoyt, 2 Mona

206, it is said that the death of a man who left home when under 30 years of

age, in seven years, is improbable by the life-tables.
2Tilghman C. J. 3 S. and R. 490.
'Cf. Young v. Shulenberg, 165 N. Y. 385; where it is said that ii a person
who acknowledged a deed in 1818 would at the trial, if alive, be more than
ioo years old, the burden is on him who alleges that he is still alive, to
prove it.
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of mis-appropriating trust moneys and the fear of the legal consequences. He was not heard from or of, for eleven years, when
the estate of a deceased cousin, of whom he was an heir, was
distributed.
The court refused to presume, in view of the
explanation of his flight and subsequent silence, that he was
dead. His age or health at the time of disappearance is not
considered.'
In the ordinary case, one who goes from his domicile will at
intervals correspond with some one who remains there, or some
one from the same domicile will come in contact with him, and
communicate that fact to persons at home. If then a long time
elapses without any advices about or from him, a not improbable
cause of this silence would be his having died.
If X would
probably write at least once in two years, if alive, and he does
not, his death before the expiration'of the two years is more or
less likely. His silence for three or five more years, deepens the
probability of his death within that longer time. "When many
years have elapsed without hearing from him" said Tilghman C.
J. "and no circumstance is shown by which this may be reasonably accounted for, it is so contrary to general experience that
he would be living, that the jury may, and ought to, presume
his death. * * * Therefore, when a man's being alive is
inconsistent with the other fact proved in the case [viz. his
silence for many years] according to general experience, it°
ought to be presumed that he is not alive."'
"Many years," the justice admitted, was an "indefinite
expression," and he declined to fix a precise number. He did
decide that, considering that 14 years and 9 months had elapsed
since S had been heard of; that, when last heard of he was at a
place between which, and his former domicile, Philadelphia, there
was free communication, and that it was then his intention to
return soon, "his being now in life would be contrary to the
usual course of things," and that the jury ought to presume
him dead.
'Wolffs' Estate, 12 W. N. C. 535, Cf. Keels' Estate, 30 W. N. C. 419.
sMiller v.Beates, 3 S. and R. 490. In Williams' Estate 8 W. N. C. 10,
a son left inApril 1853, by the ship Rockland for Australia. His mother
died probably in 1879, reciting in her will, that she had had no tidings of him
formany years. The court said thatfrom the lapse of time, the son mightbe
presumed to have died intestate and without issue. A trustfor him, in case
he should be discovered in 20 years was held valid because there was a
possibility of his being alive.
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Since Miller v. Beates, a definite time has been adopted by
the courts of Pennsylvania, failure to communicate or to be
heard of within which, will justify the inference of death. That
time is seven years. If X, having gone from his domicile, is for
seven years, not heard from or of, or if, being heard from or of,
seven years elapse since the last hearing from or of him, he
shonld be presumed to be dead.1 An absence of A, unheard of
for 25 years, when his brother died, will justify the inference that
A was dead when the brother died.'
But, when may he be presumed to have died? This question
was answered in Burr v. Sims.' A, owning land, having died
Sept. 7th, 1797, the question was, who took his land. He had had a
half-brother who would have been his heir if alive. This halfbrother had left Philadelphia for New York, Nov. 27, 1792 declaring his intention of going on a vessel for a speculative voyage to the
Spanish Main. He was never heard from or of afterwards. At
the trial in 1836 he would be presumed to be dead; but could he
be presumed to have died before Sept. 7th, 1797? Having been
-alive Nov. 27th, 1792, Gibson C. J. held that he must be presumed to have continued alive, despite his departure from his
domicile; despite his probable voyage to the Spanish Main, and
despite the fact that he had never been heard of for seven years.'
It was an error to allow the jury to infer his death within that
time. He could be inferred to have been dead, at the end of the
seven years and subsequently. A's husband left home Sept. 19th,
1881, and Wkas last heard from Feb. 17th 1883. He was presumed, in 1891, to have been dead on Feb. 18th, 1890, and not
before.' X left for Arkansas in 1835. A letter from him, dated
'Burr
v. Sims, 4 Wh. 150.
2
Duffy's Estate, 36 W. N. C. i99.
34 Wh. 173 Cf. also, Esterley's App. 109 Pa. 222.
4
Cf. also, Esterley's Appeal, 2o9 Pa. 222. A died in 1884. His son, a
lad, left home in 1879 or i88o, and had not been heard of when in 1892, the
estate of A was undergoing distribution. There was no presumption thathe
died before A. He was then entitled to his father's estate. There was a'
presumption that he was dead after 1887 or 1888, and letters of administration were granted upon his estate. This administrator was entitled to the
money, ratter than a father of A (o7 he havingdied since A) his administra-

tor. Keel's Estate, 3 W. N. C. 49. A man who at the trial, has not been
heard of for 16 years will be presumed to have died at the end of the first
seven years. Bradley v. Bradley, 4 Wh. 173.
5
Rhodes' Estate, io Pa. C. C. 386. X having gone from home on May
13 th, 1870, and not since heard of will be presumed dead on May I4 th 1877
and later. Esterley's Appeal, xo9 Pa. 222.
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Feb. 21st, 1837 was produced at the distribution in 1853. A will,
leaving a legacy to him was probated in 1840. It was proper to
infer as the auditor did, that he had died in 1844.1 A left Philadelphia for Boston Oct. 10th, 1881. A member of a benefit
association, he was assessed for March 7th, 1882, but the asessment was never paid, and his name was dropped. After the
lapse of seven years nothing having been heard from him, his
wife claimed the death benefit. She was not allowed to recover
because he was presumably alive in 1882, was therefore in
default for the assessment and was properly dropped from the
roll. His subsequent death, evidenced by the continuance of
his absence from home without tidings, did not restore his membership; or his widow's right to the money.
When A has gone from place x, to y, or to z, while he withdraws evidence from the people at x of his continuance in life, he
does not withdraw it from people at y or at z. No presumption
will be made by an auditor, jury, or judge, at y or z that A is
dead because more than seven years ago, he left x and has never
been heard of since, by people at x. It is at x that the presumption will be made, or at least some other place than y or z. The
presumption is founded on the tendency of men, when leaving a
home, to communicate with it in intervals less than 7 years in
length. If A is migrant, staying here a short time, and then
here, and then here, he is supposed not to have lost the disposition to write to his friends at home. Is it to be assumed that if he
once selects a place as a domicile, he loses the former inclination
to remember and correspond with his old friends, his wife, his
children, his parents, and is this assumed without evidence of
new attachments that could delete from his mind the original
affections of nature? F had married Watkins in 1870. Prior to
1876, Watkins left his home and his wife F at Scranton, going
with a colony to settle in Patagonia. The colony was established, and Watkins having become a member of it, was heard
from, in Lackawanna county, in 1876. In 1884 F made a will.
She married in 1886. If Watkins was still alive, when the
'Whiteside's Appeal, 23 Pa. 114. A son of the testatrix embarked for
Australia in 1853, and, so far as known, was never heard of. She died in
1879.2 His prior death would be presumed. Williams'Estate, 8 W. N. C. 310.
Mutual Benefit Co.'s Petition 174 Pa. i. Cf. Hoskins v. Lindsay,
i Del. 249.
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second marriage occurred, it was null, and did not revoke the
will of 1884. If Watkins was then dead, that marriage was
valid and revoked the will. F died in 1895. In the issue
devisavit vel non, the lapse of nearly 20 years since 1876 without
tidings from Watkins was held not to justify the inference of

his being died in 1883 and after. Says Williams J. "A presumption of death is raised by the absence of a person from his
domicile unheard of for seven years. Absence in this connection, means that a person is not at the place of his domicile, and
that his actual residence is unknown. It is for this reason
that his existence is doubtful, and that, after seven years of such
But, removal alone is not
absence his death is presumed.
enough. The further fact that he has disappeared from his
domicile and from the knowledge of those with whom he would
naturally communicate, so that his whereabouts have been
unknown for seven years or upwards, is necessary in order to
raise the presumption. But where a person removes from his
domicile in this state to establish a home for himself in another
state or country, at a place wel known, this is a change of residence, and absence from the last domicile is that upon which the
presumption must be built. If alive when last heard from, at
his new domicile,- the presumption is that life continues."'
Watkins so far as appears, had not married again. He had
with him no near relatives. Nothing eems to have occurred to
lessen his disposition to write home, except his settlement in the
colony. That had not prevented his being heard from once.
Had he been on the wing, his silence for more than seven years
would require the hypothesis of his death, at the end of the
seven years to account for it, but his silence for ten, does not
require that hypothesis, if only he had settled at one place,
although his facilities and leisure for writing would then have
been greater than had he been flitting from place to place.
Perhaps the ground of the decision is, that the silence for
'Francis v. Francis, x8o Pa. 644. F, a brother S,went west about 1838,
married there and had several children. He was visited by S in 1847, and
was then a widower, living with his Children. There has been no intercourse
Psince. S died in 1869. When partition of S's land was made in 1886, some
inquiry by letter and advertisements,as toF's being alive was fruitlessly made.
In i888 it was held that his being dead in 186,) could not be assumed. He had
a fixed and known domicile in 1847, and there was no evidence that he ever
left it, and no inquiry had been made there for him or his children. The
relatives however, in 1888, did not know in what state this domicile of 1847
was. Shepherdson's Estate,. 3 Del. 376.
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more than seven years of one of whom not enough is known to
justify assuming that he could be found on search, may be
received as evidence of death, because it would be impracticable
to send to all the places which, in his peregrinations he may
have visited; nor would there be any likelihood that traces of
him could be discovered, were these places investigated, whereas, when he is known to have formed an intention to abide at a
place, it is not unreasonable to insist on investigation at that
place, with a view to determine his continuance in life. The
inference from Watkins' silence was as strong after he had
settled in Patagonia, as it would have been, had he not settled
there, but additional evidence was apparently practicable in the
former case. On inquiry by mail or otherwise, some might have
been found who could have given evidence as to his continued
existence. X left his home in Lancaster county in 1875. In
1876 he wrote from Ft. Dodge, Kansas, his domicile, to his
brother and friends. In a proceeding instituted in 1891, under
the act of June 24th, 1885, to issue letters of administration on
his estate, it was held that the court could not properly find X to
be dead from the fact that he had not been heard from by persons
in Lancaster county, since 1876. The absence that the act of
1885 requires, says Williams J., is "from his last known place of
residence," viz: Ft. Dodge.' Here a brother had heard nothing
from X for 16 years, and a friend who was very intimate with
him and his family, had heard nothing from him for the same
period. This is as forcible evidence of his death, as if he had
been shifting from town to town and state to state during this
period, for a nomad is not more likely to correspond with persons
at his original domicile, than a colonist. But, inquiry might have
been made at Ft. Dodge, and it would possibly have resulted in
the discovery of other evidence, and for this reason, it may be,
(though the opinion does not suggest this consideration) the
court insists on the inquiry.
When a wife leaves her husband and his domicile, the fact
that he is not heard from for more than seven years, at her
newly acquired domicile, will probably be no ground for inferring
his death. A woman left her husband in England, in 1844,
coming to this country. In 1864 she married another man. It
'Morrison's Estate, 183 Pa. 155.
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was intimated though not decided by Hanna P. J. that the fact
the first husband had not been heard from would not justify an
inference of his death before the second marriage of 1864. "Her
husband was not bound to follow her to this country and must
be presumed to be still living, unless from the lapse of time the
fact of his death may be inferred."'
The effect of the assumption of a new domicile, and the
necessity that the persons who should not have heard of or from
a man, should be those at his last known domicile, does not seem
always to have bean in mind. In Campbell v. Reed 2 , David Reed
with wife and children, left Adams county in 1802, settling in
Armstrong county between 1802 and 1805. S,a brother of his, having died, the administrator ofanother brother W, claiming that
David was dead, in 1834, demanded and obtained payment
of the whole personal estate of S.
In 1853 David Reed's
administrator sued S's administrator for David's half of
the fund, and was allowed to recover.
It
is assumed
by Knox J. that if the defendant had made reasonable inquiry
for David, and had failed to learn of his being alive, he might
have escaped liability. It is more than likely said the court that
diligent inquiry would have ascertained David's residence. He
adds however, that "as nothing had been heard from David Reed
for many years, the law would [viz. in 1834 when the payment to
W's administrator was made] -raise a presumption of his death,
and had he been a bachelor, when last known or heard from, the
presumption would be that he died unnmarried and without
issue.' ' Here, David had in fact settled in Armstrong county,
but that he had done so was not known to the relatives in Adams
county. They would have found it out by reasonably diligent

'Williams' Estate, 8 W. N. C. 310. It was held however, that, in view
of the lapse of 20 years prior to the marriage of 1864 and of 12 years subsequently, during which period of 32 years she had not heard from or of him,
and in view of the presumption of innocence, it might be inferred that the
first husband was dead before the marriage of 1864.
224 Pa. 498.
"Knox J. intimates that there might be a presumption of the death of
David from his not having been heard from, without a similar presumption
of the death of his wife and child.
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inquiry.' In 1862, in order to prove that Isaac Johnson, a negro,
was dead in July, 1857, his wife testified that he went to sea in
1823, and had not been heard from since, except that, when she
came to Philadelphia to live in 1832 she had heard that he was
living in Portland, Me., with another woman. She had written
two letters to him, but had received no answer. These facts
justified the court in charging the jury that the presumption was
that Isaac Johnson was dead.2 No investigation had been made
at Portland.
It has already appeared that when the inference of death is
to be made from a departure from domicile, and from silence, the
silence must have lasted for more than seven years, and the
death will be presumed to have happened only at the close of the
seven years. A shorter time will suffice, however, when it is
shown that the missing one was "in contact with a specific
peril," 3 that, e. g. he was on a vessel when it was wrecked, or in
a party that came into warlike conflict with Indians; and suffered
serious losses. But taking ship from the United States is not
being in contact with a specific peril. "The perils of the sea are
general," not specific, says Gibson C. J. "and they are not
present but contingent.
They are such as may or may not
occur, but to accelerate the presumption from time, or more
properly, to turn it from an artificial into a natural one, it is neccessary to bring the person within the range of a particular and
an immediate danger-not such as is contingently incident in
some degree, to every mode of conveyance."
Hence, the fact
that A had taken the voyage, about which there was no other
information, would not justify the inference that he was dead
five years after he had left his domicile.4 A man, intending to
leave New York for Boston, left his place of business at 3 o'clock
p. in., Oct. 10th, 1881, declaring his purpose to go to the rail'InKeech v. Rinehart, io Pa. 240, G died in i8oo. His daughter E,
had removed from the state about 1788 and had' never been heard from
since. In an action by her administrator in 2848 for her share of her
father's estate, against the administrator of the administrator of the father,
the court below held that she must be presumed to have died before her
father, on account of her absence for seven years unheard of. The judgment was reversed because the evidence additional to that of this absence,
had not been submitted to the jury. Fault was found not with the presumption,2but with ignoring the evidence tending to repel it.
Holmes v. Johnson, 42 Pa. 159.
3Burr v. Sims, 4 Wh. 15o.
4Burr v. Sims, 4 Wh. 15o.
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road station. He was never afterwards heard from. In 1895
the attempt was to show that he was dead before March 7th,
1882. As there was no direct evidence of this death was there
sufficient indirect evidence? No facts furnishing a motive for
suicide were visible. "There is nothing" said the court, "'in the
testimony to show that appellant's husband, when last seen or
heard of, was exposed to any such specific peril, or to any peril
sufficient to take the case out of the operation of the general
rule above stated" viz: that the death presumed from long
absence from the domicile, will be presumed to have occurred
not sooner than the end of seven years from the initial disappearance.' Being on the way to Boston from New York, by
rail, is not being in 'contact with a specific peril.
The death of a man who has gorie from his former home,
and has not been heard of for seven years, may be rebutted, as
we have seen. He may have had a distinctly disclosed motive
to refrain from communication with his domicile, as when he has
fled to escape a prosecution.' The fact that a testator assumes
the continued life of an absent son, will not (there being no evidence that he had any tidings of him) require the rejection by
those interested in the estate of the presumption of the son's
death after the testator. The last letter was received from him
in 1837. His father died in 1840, bequeathing to him money, if
he should call for it; if not, bequeathing it to two grand-sons.
In 1853 proceedings to compel the payment of the legacy to the
grand-sons were begun. The death was presumed to have
occurred in 1844, despite the apparent assumption by the testator
that he was alive in 1840. Says Black C. J., "The testator had
no ground for believing him dead within three years after the
date of his letter; though he was evidently uncertain about it.
* * * A person is presumed to be dead after the lapse of
seven years from the time when he was last actually heard of,
and this presumption is not repelled by the fact that somebody
(though the testator under whose will the money is claimed)
'Mut. Benef. Co.'s Petition.

174 Pa. I.
Wolff's Estate, 12 W. N. C. 535. A boy having embezzled money and
disappeared, this was mentioned as a possible explanation of his concealment of himself for a series of years. Nevertheless, letters of administration upon his estate were issued eight or nine years after his disappearance.
Keel's Estate, 30 W. N. C. 419.
2
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supposedhim to be living at a later period."' If the case of
Keech vs. Rinehart' is to be taken seriously, an admission by one
distributee at a certain date, subsequent to the intestate's death,
that another distributee, a sister, is alive, is receivable in a later
proceeding as some proof that at that time she was alive, despite
the presumption that would otherwise have been decisive. A died
in 1800. His daughter B had left the state in 1788, and had
not been sinceheard of. In the account by X the administrator of
the administrator, in 1825, of A's estate, a sum of money was
retained for the use of B. In a subsequent action by the admin-.
istrator of B against the administrator of X, for the sum, it
appeared that in a proceeding in partition in 1804 or 1805 by
others of the children of A, they had enumerated the heirs, and
named B as one of them. It was held in an action for this distributive share, brought about 1848, that the assertion by the
administrator in 1825, and by the heirs in 1804, or 1805, that B
was alive ought to have been submitted to the jury as evidence
from which, despite the long absence of B, they might infer that
she was still alive in 1825 when the money was retained for her.3
The presumption of life despite considerable absence may be
weaker than that of innocence, so that, when it is necessary, if the
life of X is presumed, to hold Y to have been quilty of a crime,
the court will prefer to infer the death of X. Y having left her
husband X in England, in 1844, and come to Pennsylvania, in
1864 married another. She did not hear of X since she left him.
After her death, the second husband claimed against the will. It
was apparently held that "every presumption should be raised in
favor of her innocence, and that, prior to her second marriage,
testatrix, (Y) had by inquiry and correspondence ascertained the
death of her husband."'4
The presumption of death is founded not alone on absence
from a former domicile, but also upon the absence of communications from him: or of information about him. The probability
is that the absent one, if he continues alive will in seven years
'Whiteside's Appeal, 23 Pa. Ii4.

Pa. 240.
3The petition for partition, by a son, averred that twelve children (including B) survived A. The sheriff on returning the inquisition, certified
21o

that he had warned all the parties to be present. These proceedings, says
Bell J., contained "at least the assertions of members of the family,"
'Williams' Estate, 8 W. N. C. 310.
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write to his relatives at the old home. They will know whether
they have received letters. Others would hardly know whether
they had, but from hearsay. In Whiteside's Appeal1 one not a relative, testified that relatives once got a letter from" X the absent
one; that he had heard them speak of X, that they said that that
letter was the last received.
Black C. J. thought the proof
might have been stronger, but that it was "enouagh to make out
a case Primafacie in the absence of all contradiction.
The
testimony of a relative would have been more satisfactory than
that of a neighbor or friend, but, if the members of the family
had heard of the person in question more lately than 1837, why
did not the executor call them?"
A brother of the supposed deceased, testificd in Morrison's Estate' to the receipt by himself of
letters and to his ignorance of any letters having since been
received by anybody.
A very intimate friend and neighbor
testified that himself had never received any word from him, and
that for 14 years no one had told him that he had heard from
the absent one. In Wolff's Estate3 where a cousin had left home,
eleven years before the death of the deceased, evidence of inquiry
for him was received. A single witness testified that he had
asked people in New York whether they had ever heard or known
of him, but they had never heard anything; and that he had written
to the keeper of a hotel in that city, where the absent one had
stayed for some time after his flight, and in reply, had been informed that he had left there, not saying whither he was going.
This evidence is pronounced "wholly insufficient" by Penrose J.
But why? The absent one was traced to a hotel in New York.
Inquiry was made there, but it resulted in nothing of importance.
Where else should inquiry have been made? In what other
hotels or boarding houses in New York? In what other towns
or cities?'
123 Pa. uI4. 2183 Pa. i55. 3x2 W. N. C.
'The circumstances preceeding his departure indicated that the person
in question would conceal his whereabouts. This alone was sufficient to
repel any presumption based on continued absence and silence. The judge
disparages the reliability of the presumption, pointihg to the many cases in
which despite an absence of seven years, subsequent evidence proves the
absent one to be alive. He also suggests that the presumption becomes less
trustworthy, as the facilities for escaping to the hitherto inaccessible parts
of the world multiply. In Taylor v. Hoyt, 2 Mona. 206, it is said per curiain
that the presumption of death after 7 years of absence, of a person not more
than 30 years old when he disappeared, is unwarranted in fact, for by the
life tables, the presumption is the contrary "unless indeed one's absence from
and want of communication with his former place of abode may be supposed to shorten his life."
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When a man is presumed dead from his silence after leaving
his domicile, for more than seven years, he is presumed to have
contracted no domestic relations different from those he had when
he was last heard from. If he was a bachelor, he will be presumed to have died such. If he was childless when last heard
of, he will be presumed to have died childless.' But, apparently,
if he was married and had a child, when he was last heard of,
there would be no presumption that they had died, although
there would be that he had. Why, is not indicated. Is it because
they would not likely write to their former home once in seven
years? A young child would not be thus likely, but would the
wife be unlikely to remember and correspond with her parents,
brothers and sisters?
The presumption of death may be iuvoked probably in all
imaginable cases in whiph the death of a person is a determinative
fact. It may be employed in ejectment, by one who claims as
sole heir of X to the exclusion of an absent brother2 oi: by those
who claim as remoter next of kin, to the exclusion of an absent
half-brother of the deceased owner of the land.' When the
ejectment is on the legal title against a purchaser, because of
default in paying the purchase money, if his defence is that the
widow of a former owner has dower, which she may assert, her
death may be presumed.4 Under'the act of June 24th, 1885'
providing for the grant: of letters of administration on thd estates
of persons presumed dead from absence, and under the second
section of the act of April 18th, 1853, commonly called the Price
Act, providing for sale of land of a person who has been absent
"Campbell v. Reed, 24 Pa. 498; Miller v. Beates, 3 S. and R: 49o; Duffy's
Estate, 36, W. N. C. 199. In Brookes' Estate, 13 Dist. 29, a person claim-

ing to be X claimed as distributee. Another distributee objected on the
alleged ground that the claimant was not X and that X had died 20 years
before. The e idence, of his death was the fact that X's daughter'had been
seen 2on the streets of Camden, N. J., wearing a black dress.

Holmes v. Johnson, 42 Pa. 159.
v. Sims, 4 Wh. iSo.
1nnis v. Campbell, i R. 419.
52 P. & L. 3284; Cf. In re Forms of Procedure 3 Pa. C. C. 5; McElroy
v. Savings Fund, 2 Pa. C. C. 643; Morrison's Estate, 183 Pa. 55; Rhodes'
Estate, xo Pa. C. C. 3$6; Sherwood's Estate, 2o6 Pa. 465; Zeigler's Estate,
25 Pa. C. C. 611; Beck's Estate, 12 Lanc. 42; 4 Dist. 22z, Renner's Estate, 6
Dist. 84. The act of x885 is eonstitutional: Cunnius v. School District, 2o6
Pa. 469, reversing z Super. 34o and affirmed by the Supreme Court of the
United States.
3
Burr
4
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and unheard from1 the presumption may be employed, as it may,
when in an issue to determine whether the will of a woman was
revoked by a subsequent marriage, proof of the death of a former
husband prior to the time of the second marriage is attempted;2
or when, in the distribution of a decedent's estate, the share of
X, who, if alive would be his distributee, is allotted to others.
because of his long absence, and the inferred death,' or when in
the distribution of a testatrix's estate, one claims against the will,
as husband and it is alleged that the marriage with him was void
because of the fact that an earlier-husband, from whom she had
long been separated was still alive;' or when, in the distribution
of the proceeds of the sale of A's real estate, one who has bought
at an execution sale, the interest thereih of X a cousin, claims this
share, as against an administrator of X. 5 In an action for a legacy
given to A, or, he dying without claiming it, to B, the death of A
could be established by the presumption. 6 A dies leaving two
sons. A third son has been absent for nine years. Partition of
A's land is made, and the two sons take it subject to owelty,
which is put into the hands of a trustee durante absentia for the
third son. In a subsequent distribution of this owelty, the court
will inquire whether the third son predeceased A, and in doing
so, will employ the presumption. Deciding that this son had
died before his father, it will refuse to award the money to a
'Taylor v. Hoyt, 15 Allan. 892; z Mona. 2o6; Charlton's Estate, 12 Phila.
Trickett, Guardians, 356.
2
1Francis v. Francis, i8o Pa. 644.
3Miller v. Beates, 3 S. & R. 49o; Keech v. Rinehart, io Pa. 240; Clement's Estate, i Del. r67. There was an issue in the Common Pleas to determine when the death occurred, in Bradley v. Bradley, 4 Wh. 173. Cf.
Wanner's Estate, i Wood. 112, where a portion of A's estate having been
awarded to B, and B died before payment leaving C his next of kin; C's
death was inferrible from his absence, and an administrator of his estate
having been appointed the money was paid to this administrator. In
Campbell v. Reed, 24 Pa. 498, an executor, assuming from his long absence,
the death of one son pays both shares to the other. In a subsequent action
by the executor of this pretermitted son, who had in fact survived the father, it is apparently assumed that the long absence would have justified the
executor's taking his death for granted,:but not in ignoring the possibility of
the survival of a widow and child.
'Williams' Estate, 8 W. N. C. 310.
5
Wolff's Estate, 2z W. N. C. 535. X had left home eleven years before
A's death; not having been heard of since. Before the Orphans' Court sale
of A's land, the execution against X had resulted in the sale of his interest
therein. The court found no sufficient evidence that he was dead prior to
of the judgment against him.
the recovery
6
Whiteside's Appeal, 23 Pa. 1i4.
102;
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creditor who had obtained judgment against hinl.' In a suit for
purchase money of land, the question was as to the goodness of
the title. A former owner had executed in 1812 a power of
attorney to convey it. The attorney did not convey until 1823.
In 1824, it was contended that the principal should be considered
to have died before 1823, and thus, to have revoked the power.2
The widow of a member of a benefit association claiming the
death benefit, the association set up the defence that he had been
dropped for iion-payment of an assessment. His death prior to
this assessment might be established by his long prior absence.3
The omission of notice to the husband of a co-tenant of land,
in partition proceedings, of the time and place of the meeting of
the inquest, will not vitiate the proceedings, when it appears
that he has been absent and unheard of for a period exceeding
seven years.4 A bequest to a trustee in trust for a brother of
of testatrix, who at her death has been absent and unheard of
for 25 years, if he shall within one year be discovered to be alive,
but, if this brother should die without issue, to A, is payable to
A after the year, he not being found, because he will be presumed to have died without issue.5 The presumption of death may
be applied in an issue directed by the Orphans' court to determine the time of death of a person known to be dead.6
The jury, in trials by jury, must determine whether X has
been absent for seven years or longer, and whether he has been
heard of or not; but, apparently, when the absence and the
silence for seven years or more, have been found by them, they
must, in the absence of rebutting evidence, find that X died at
the end of the seven years, and therefore was dead at all later
times.' X having been absent and unheard of for 16 years,
King P. J. said to the jury: "We give you the law that the
death is to be presumed at seven years after his absence, and
after the last time he was heard of." Knox J. remarks,8 of a
similar case, "the law would raise a presumption of his death."
There is therefore more than an option to draw the inference of
death; there is a duty to draw it, unless some additional facts
appear that would account for concealment or silence, consistently
with continuance in life; or that otherwise would, like assumption of a new domicile, weaken the reliability of the concealment
or silence.
'Esterley's Appeal, 5O9 Pa. 222.
2Fulweiler v. Baugher, 15 S. & R. 45. The presumption of death was
refused because there was no evidence that the principal had removed from
his former
abode and had not been heard of for seven years.
3
Mut. Benefit Co's Petition, 174 Pa. i. But the absence had not been
long4enough.
Welch's Appeal, 126 Pa. 297.
5
Duffy's Estate, 36 W. N. C. i99. Cf. Williams' Estate, 8 W. N. C. 310.
6
7Bradley v. Bradley, 4 Wh. 173.
Bradley v. Bradley, 4 Wh. 173; Miller v. Beates, ? S. & R. 490.
8
Campbell v. Reed, 24 Pa. 498; Whiteside's Appeal 23 Pa. 114.
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MOOT COURT.
HENDERSON VS SMITH.
Sale-Defined-Passage of Title-Intention of Parties.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Henderson sold a horse to Smith for $2oo. It was agreed that the horse
should remain with Henderson until the money was paid which was to occur
five days later. On the proper day Smith repaired to Henderson with the
money intending to pay it and receive the horse. He was then informed
that the horse had died the night before of a disease, and he declined to pay.
Assumpsit for the $2oo.
Lewis for the plaintiff.
Property changes immediately upon making of contract, although actual
possession be postponed: Welsh v. Bell, 32 Pa. j6. Contract of sale vests
equitable title in vendee. He becomes entitled to all advantages that may
arise and is responsible for all losses that may befall it: Reed v. Lukens,
44 Pa. 2oo; Trimble v. Wimble, io Forum, 204.
Tobin for the defendant.
To pass title to personal property a delivery is required, and an actual,
notorious and unequivocal possession: Herr v. Denver, etc. Co., 6 L. R. A.,
641. Where continued existence of a specific thing is essential to performance of contract, its destruction without fault of either party operates as a
discharge: Dexterv. Norton 47 N. Y., 62; Ward v. Vance, 93 Pa. 499.

OPINION OF THE COURT.
REED, J.:-The first question that arises for our determination is:
Did the parties intend that title to the property should vest immediately,
without actual delivery, or was it their intention that transfer of title should
be postponed until actual delivery shall be made, on the day appointed? If
the intention of the parties is manifested clearly and unequivocally it controls: Winslow v. Leonard, 24 Pa. 14; Gonser v. Smith, 115 Pa. 452.
From the statement of the case we learn that Henderson "sold" Smith
a horse. Under an agreement, the exact nature of which does not appear,
"the horse should remain -with Henderson until the money was paid, which
was to occur five days later." No further material facts relating to the
agreement are given. We have no knowledge whether the contract was
oral or in writing. Nor do we know whether that part of the agreement,
"that the horse should remain with Henderson until the money was paid,"
was part of the contract to sell the horse, or an independent agreement
made subsequently thereto. According to the evidence we have at hand,
the contract seems open to at least two constructions. It may be inferred
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from the facts that the sale was actually consummated, Smith agreeing to
allow Henderson to retain the horse as security for the purchase money. If
such was the contract, title vested immediately in Smith: Benjamin on
Sales, 329; Welsh v. Bell, 32 Pa. 16; Bowen v. Burk, 13 Pa. 146; Pringle v.
Pringle, 59 Pa. 281. On the other hand, the facts may possibly justify a
conclusion that the actual agreement of the parties was to the effect that if
five days from date Henderson should tender delivery, Smith would then
make payment, or vice versa, that if Smith would tender payment, Henderson
would then make deliVery. If such was the contract, title would remain in
Henderson until said tender of delivery or payment was made: Benjamin
on Sales, 334; McCandlish v. Newman, 22 Pa. 46o; Sneathen v. Grubbs, 88
Pa. 147; Tiffany on Sales, 86.
The intention of the parties, therefore, is not clearly shown by the
agreement. In deciding the question whether title vested in Smith or remained in Henderson we are bound to consider not only the particular circumstances surrounding the transaction, but also certain definite rules of
construction which tfte courts have adopted to determine the presumed
intention of the parties: Tiffany on Sales, 83; Benjamin on Sales, 322.
It has been almost uniformly held that where there has been no manifestation of a contrary intention, the presumption of law is that the contract
is an actual sale, and that the transfer of title takes place at once, in advance
of actual delivery, if the article be agreed upon and ready for actual delivery.
The retention of possession by the seller as security for the purchase price
does not affect the presumption stated: 24 A. & E. Enc'y. of Law, 1051-52.
Although, as we have previously stated, we believe a conclusion might
possibly be drawn from the facts, that the parties intended that either payment or delivery should be a condition precedent to the vesting of title, it is
at best, but an inference. There is no express statement indicating such
intention. The horse was definitely agreed upon and was, as far as appears,
ready for immediate delivery. The facts are insufficient to warrant finding
an intention on the part of the parties that the passage of title be suspended
until date set for delivery. We accordingly hold that prior to, and at the
time the horse died, title thereto had vested in Smith.
Counsel for defendant, however, has argued that, independently of the
question of passage of title, there could be no:recovery, on the theory that.
where the continued existence of a specific thing is essential to the performance of a contract, its destruction operates as a discharge, provided the
destruction was not the fault of either party. Thi* doctrine has been
adopted in Dexter v. Norton, 47 N. Y. 6z, The Tornado, 1o8 U. S., 342, and
numerous other cases. As to its soundness, as well as to its universality,
there can be no question. In all the cases cited by counsel, however, this
doctrine has been applied to executory contracts exclusively. And, indeed,
from jhe very nature of things it would seem that it must be so limited.
When, as in this case, title has already passed, the contract is completely at
an end. Hence we conclude this doctrine has no applicability. The general
rule that where the gubject of the sale is lost or destroyed, the loss must
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fall upon the party who holds the title, fully applies to this case., 4 A.& E.
Enc'y. of Law, 1046.
In deciding this case, we do not desire to be construed as contravening
the rule that delivery is essential to transfer as against creditors and bona
fide purchasers without notice. Clow v. Woods, 5 S. & R. z5; McKibbin
v. Martin, 64 Pa. 352; Stephens v. Gifford, 137 Pa. 219.

Thereis no question

but that the result would be otherwise were the title of Smith attacked by a
third party, without notice.
Having determined that title vested in Smith, we entertain no doubt
but that Henderson may recover the purchase price of $200, the amount
asked for in this suit.., The right of the vendor to maintain an action forthe
price agreed upon, where the buyer refuses to pay according to the terms of
the contract, has repeatedly been recognized. Tiffany on Sales, 233; 24 A.
& E. Enc'y. of Law, 1120. We therefore direct that judgment be rendered
for plaintiff.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The sale of the horse was upon a credit of five days. Until the price
should be paid, it was agreed that the horse should remain with Henderson,
the vendor. This agreement is consistent with either of two hypotheses:
(a) that the ownership of the horse was to pass at once, but be subject to a
right of detention, a lien, until payment was made, and (b) that the ownership of the horse was not to pass until payment, and was, on payment, to
pass along with the possession.
If the intention was that the ownership should pass at once, the loss of
the horse was Smith's, the vendee. He could not deflect it upon Henderson,
by declining to pay for the horse: On the other hand, if the ownership was
not to pass until payment, the death of the horse was the death of Henderson's horse, and there is no valid ground for casting its effect upon Smith.
The learned court below has understood from the evidence that the
ownership had passed to Smith, when the horse's death occurred. We are
not prepared to say that it was in error. The special verdict says that
Henderson "sold" the horse. Many authorities, understand by "sale" a
passing of ownership. It is defined to be a "transmutation of property,"-by
Blackstone; "a transfer of the absolute or general property," by Benjamin;
"the exchange of property for a price," by the lfidian Contract Act, and by
Kerr; "the transfer of the property or a thing for a price in money," by
Tiffany; "a transfer of the abs6lute title to property for a certain agreed
price," by Story. While at times sale is defined "a contract for the transfer
of property from ope person to another for a valuable consideration," (Kent),
this language is adopted because a sale is the effect of a contract, and because it was not necessary to make the distinction between a contract
eventuating in a simultaneous transfer and one eventuating in a future
transfer.
The essence of sale is the passage of the ownership of a chattel for a
price, from the present owner to another. That "sold" in the special verdict
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must receive this interpretation-is clear unless something else therein forbids. Besides the sale the verdict states that it was agreed that the horse
should "remain with Henderson" until the price was paid. But the horse's
remaining with Henderson does not negative its having become Smith's.
Nor does the fact that the purchase money was not immediately paid negative that transition of ownership.
We think the conclusion reached by the learned court below sound.
Judgment affirmed.

TOTTEN VS. FARRIERS' BANK et al.
Trust-Description of Cestul que Trust-Certainty-Power of Revocation.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Plaintiff's uncle, John Richards, deposited a sum of money in the defendant bank to the credit of "John Richards, Trustee for James Totten." The
original deposit was added to from time to time by Richards but all
without Totten's knowledge. Later Totten learned of the same from the
bank and further upon inquiry of the uncle was told by the latter that he had
changed his mind and that he purposed changing the account to his private
one. Plaintiff then brought this bill against the bank and Richards praying
that they be restrained from interfering with the account. The original and
subsequent deposits were purely gratuitous.
Hoover for the plaintiff.
Dickerson's Appeal, 115 Pa. 2o; Smith's Estate, 144 Pa. 428.
Skinner for the defendant.
The power of revocation may be reserved and is perfectly consistent
with the ci eation of a valid trust: Reiff's Appeal, i6 Pa. Sup. 8o; Dickerson's Appeal, ix 5 Pa. 198.

OPINION OF THE COURT.
VAN SCOTEN, J.:-This is a bill in Equity by James Totten, praying
that the Farmers' Bank and John Richards be restrained from interfering
with a certain account in said bank.
Richards, an uncle of the petitioner, lgratiutously deposited a sum of
money in the Farmers' Bank to the credit of "John Richards, Trustee for
James Totten," to which he added subsequent deposits; all deposits being
made without the petitioner's knowledge. Upon learning of the transaction
from the bank, Totten approached his uncle and was told that he had
changed his mind and that he proposed changing the account to his private
one. Whereupon Totton files this bill in Equity.
The cases are numerous in which the gift is construed as executed and
thereby constitute an executed Trust or a title absolutely in the donee, where
the donor dies without interfering with the gift, but these cases cannot apply
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to this case, for as we hope to show, a further and more technical element
enters;--the question of intention. In creating a trust or a gift, "The intention of the donor is the first thing which the court seeks to discover:"
Russell Appeal, 75 Pa. 279. What wa- the intention of Richards at the
time of creating this account? Did he intend an executed gift by a transfer
of title, constituting an irrevocable trust, did he intend an executory gift
which he might revoke, or an executed revocable trust?
An executed trust exists when the legal interest is in one person (the
trustee) the equitable interest is in another (the cestui que trust) and the
limitations and trusts are fully and perfectly deciured: Wallace v. Wainwright, 8 Pa. 263; Chaffee v. Rick, 24 Pa. 432; Cushing v. Blake, 30 N. J.

Eq. 689. As the original deposit was added to from time to time, the trust
wasincomplete and suiely the bare words "John Richards, Trustee for James
Totton," would not without further declarations constitute an executed trust,
therefore the trust not being "fully and properly declared" it is not an executed trust.
The English rule applicable to this case as laid down in Hall v. Hall,
Law Re. 14 Eq. 365 is that "Where in a voluntary settlement, a revocable
deed would have answered, the settlers intention and purpose as well as an
irrevocable one, the absence of a power of revocation is prima facia evidence
of mistake which can be rebutted only by showing that the settler's attention was called to the fact that the instrument was irrevocable and that he
could have equally effected his purpose by a revocable one;" therefore, the
petitioner must rebut this presumption by establishing the purpose ard
intention of Mr. Richards, but we fail to find any evidence applicable; while
on the other hand the changed purpose of Mr. Richards and the fact of his
not informing the petitioner of the deposit makes it clear that an executory
gift, subject to some contingency was intended. This position is sustained
in Potts vs.U. S. Fid. Ins. Trust & Safe Dep. Co. ig9 Pa. St. 36o where it is
laid down that "A voluntary settlement may be revoked by the settler, where
there appears no deliberate intent on his part that it shall be irrevocable
and no motive for this settlement exists.". There is no evidence sufficient
to establish a motive for this settlement. The relation of uncle and nephew,
without other circumstances is too remote to establish either motive or consideration.
It is not authoritatively laid down just what clauses a deed of voluntary
settlement should or should not contain, each case must be judged by .its
own circumstances, but when certain clauses usually contained in a deed of
trust are omitted, satisfactory proof must establish that such omission was
intentional; Russell's Appeal supra, and Loker v. Loker 3 De. Gex. Jones
& Son, 487, and Hall v. Hall. supra, therein cited, sustain this doctrine.
In Minor v.Rogers,4o Conn. 512,relied upon by the petitidner, the donor
had told the parents of the child the reason for making the deposit and
later.drew the money out in her own name not adding "trustee," aside from
this there was no evidence of revocation and the case arose after the death
of the donor, but even with these facts there were two affirming and two
dissenting justices. Each case cited by the petitioner's able counsel like
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Minor v. Rogers, rest on their own particular circumstances although the
rule is correctly laid down in Martin v. Funk, 75 N. Y. 136, that "The act
constituting the transfer must be consummated and not remain incomplete
or rest in mere intention" and whether the gift is by delivery, by the creation
of a trust in a third person or in creating the donor himself a trustee, the
rule will apply. In deciding this case we adopt the English rule as held in
Wolleston v. Tripe, Law. Rep. 9 Eq. 44, that "A voluntary gift not subject to
a power of revocation (or an executory gift) may be set aside by the donor,"
provided however that the gift has not been acted upon or has not become
an executed trust.
The prayer of the-petitioner asking 'for an injunction is denied and
refused.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
Richards deposited the money to his own name, as trustee for Totten.
He did not, by the description of himself, deprive himself of the ordinary
power of a depositor. The nature of the trust is not declared. Itmayrequire
the withdrawal of the deposit for the purpose of reinvestment, or in order
to be expended for the cestui que trust. In the absence of evidence of an
intended misappropriation, the bank would be compelled to honor Richards'
checks and could not be enjoined against honoring them. Penna. Title&
Trust Co. v. Mayer, 201 Pa. 299.
Had an absolute gift to Totten of the money been intended, Richards
would have deposited the money in Totten's name, subject to Totten's check.*
The deposit, thus made, with notice to Totten, would have been irrevocable.
The form of the deposit indicates that Richards intended to control it; to
retain the power of disposing of it. The nature of the obligation, if any, he
assumed towards Totten, with regard to it, does not appear. Was the money
to be spent at Richards' discretion for Totten? Was it to be kept permainently unexpended? The existence of the trust seems not to have been
communicated to Totten by Richards. He learned of it from the bank.
But all he learned was, that a sum of money was on deposit in the name of
Richards, "trustee for James Totten." He did not learn for what purpose
it was there; the object of the trust; the duties of the trustee.
This, we think is the objection to the present bill. The terms of the
trust, the trust itself, are too vaguely proved. The making of the deposit in
the way in which it was made, is not conclusive of any trust. A may adopt
any name he chooses in making a deposit,-may describe himself in any
way, and he may intend to make himself agent, or attorney, or trustee for
nobody, although he thus names himself. But even if he intends to be a
trustee, it is still needful to know, when the money has been his own, and he
is voluntarily and without concert with another, making himself a trustee
of it, what kind of trust he is imposing on himself.
That Richards intended to make himself a trustee of any kind, is uncertain. He does not tell Totten that he is going to revoke the trust, or repudiate
it. He says simply that he purposes to change the account to his private
one, that is, is going to check out, as trustee, all the money on deposit, and
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deposit it to himself not as trustee. No circumstances appear from which
any trust can be safely inferred; none from which the features of a trust, if
trust there be, may be divined.
It is, in this view, unnecessary to say whether, had a trust appeared,
gratuitously imposed upon himself by Richards, he would have had the
power to revoke it. The doctrine of revocation is as nebulous and vague as
most of the doctrines which have been invented. As it does not appear
-under what circumstances any trust was made, or what its motives were, or
how meritorious a beneficiary Totten was; as no duress, fraud, imposition, or
improvidence is manifest, it is not possible to say, had the trust been ever
enforceable whether it could lose its obligation by the violition of the trustee.
Appeal dismissed.

BOOK REVIEWS.
Pennsylvania Common School Law, by Chester C. Bashore,
LL.B. of the Cumberland County Bar. Soney &Sage, Newark,

N.J.
The department of education is one of the most important departments
of the government of any modern state. Indeed few others are comparable
with it. Defence against external enemies, defence against internal crime,
against disease, against crop failures, against business paralysis are important, but few measures to effect these are efficacious, unless the masses of
the people are intelligent. To feed the mind is as important as to feed
the body, and the body cannot be fed unless the mind that animates
it has sense enough to command the food. It is not suprising, then,
that Pennsylvania has found it necessary, in arranging a system of
education, to enact statutes which cover 75 of the closely printed
pages of Stewart's Purden's Digest. Elaborate and minute as this
legislation is, the language of the statutes fail to solve many problems connected with school administration, and these problems have given
rise to much litigation. It is evident a priori, therefore, that a book which
classifies the topics of school law on a scientific plan, and which exhibits
under each head, the statutory and decisional determinations pertaining to
it, must be of very great value. It must be of value in the first instance to
the school directors and officers, and to the teachers, and citizens. It must
also be of value to lawyers and others whose business it is to give advice to
the former classes respecting their rights and duties concerning school.
The work before us well analyses its subject. Dealing first with the
geographical sub-divisions of the state into districts, it shows how they are
organized into corporations, and vhat are their powers and duties. The
election, qualifications and powers of directors are then discussed, together
with their meetings, and the organization of them. Interesting chapters on
public high schools and on evening schools follow. The discussion of the
power of directors to shape the studies of scholars and to expel them for
misconduct is interesting. The chapters on indebtedness and taxation are
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extensive, elaborate and correspondingly important. At the present time
the treatment of compulsory attendance and of the right of the directors and
teachers to exclude from the schools for refusal to submit to vaccination is
particularly interesting. Chapters are devoted to teachers' institutes, to text
books, to city and borough superintendents, to normal schools, to state
appropriations, and in brief, to every subject germane to public education.
A very minute and extensive index makes it possible for any body,
whether lawyer or laymen, to find anything in the book with celerity.
The type is clear and the paper good, and the topics dealt with in the
sections indicated by thick-faced type. No space is wasted in irrelevant
discussion by the writer. He invariably confines himself to the reproduction
of the printed statute, and when possible of zi.issima verba of the decisions
of the courts. This avoids the necessity of hunting the statute or the report
for verification, and makes the work self-dependent and integral.
The Limitations of the Taxing Power, by James M. Gray.
Bancroft-Whitney Company, San Francisco.
This is a more than ordinary book, written with a more than ordinary
lucidity and completeness. The 2nd chapter deals with definitions, the
scope of the taxing power, and an analysis of franchise taxes. The analysis
is original and scientific. One of the perplexing subjects connected with
taxation, is the territorial limitation of taxing power. There is no other extant
treatise that nearly so luminously deals with it. It treats under separate
heads, the situs of tangible property, motor cars, and ships; the situs of
credits, including mortgages, bank deposits, corporate stock. The discussion of the purposes of taxation involves the consideration of various constitutional provisions. There are chapters on the delegation of taxing
power, local self-government, the federal taxing power with its limitations,
the state taxing power with its limitationg. The state taxation of federal
agencies, of national banks, of instruments of commerce, is peculiarly able.
Two chapters are devoted to taxation as impairing the obligation of
contracts. The theory of uniformity and of exemptions is well presented in
chapter i8. The constitutional doctrine of equality and uniformity in the
several states is set out seriatim, in chapter 23. An examination of so much
of the chapter as deals with Pennsylvania convinces the writer of the accuracy and fulness of the work. Few branches of the general subject have
given rise to more controversy than that of local assessments, to which over
So pages of the work are devoted. A chapter containing 135 pages, deals
with limitations on the power to contract debts.
It is not often that one can so unreservedly commend to the notice of
the profession, a treatise in law. The importance and the difficulty of the
subject make such a work necessary. The thoroughness, accuracy and perspicuousness, and not least, the grace and agreeableness of style of this
book deserve the attention of every practicing lawyer and every student of
political problems.

